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Recent Decisions
OBSCENITY -

OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS -

PANDERING

Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967).
On June 12, 1967, the last day of the October 1966 term, the
United States Supreme Court rendered several two-line per curiam
decisions in cases involving obscenity censorship. It appears that
these short opinions may be useful in clearing up some of the confusion which exists in this area of constitutional law. The utility
that these opinions may possess can be ascertained only after a perhaps unnecessarily rigorous examination and comparison of the
facts, issues, and holdings of several cases. Although the Supreme
Court's use of these very short per curiam opinions may be a rather
vague method of clarifying its previous decisions, the procedure is
not without precedent.1
It is the purpose of this article to examine the contribution of
one recent per curiam decision, Books, Inc. v. United States,. toward
reducing the confusion in the area of obscenity censorship. Briefly,
it may be said that this case clarifies the rule announced in Ginzburg
v. United States3 pertaining to evidential requirements in criminal
prosecutions under obscenity statutes. It also appears that while
the Ginzburg rule has survived, its scope may have been effectively
limited to its facts. A further, but weaker, implication may be
drawn that the Court is becoming more liberal in its outlook on
censorship. Before presenting an analysis of Books, Inc. v. United
States,4 it would be well to first examine the development of the
common law regarding censorship of allegedly obscene material.
This area of constitutional law is concerned with the first
amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
In February 1957, the United States Supreme Court established in
Butler v. Michigan' the principle that first amendment protection
(via the 14th amendment) would be afforded to persons prosecuted
under State obscenity statutes. Although this first step was significant and carefully taken, many questions were yet to be answered.
After Butler, the question remained whether any statute would
1 See text accompanying notes 9-14 infra.

2 388
3 383
4 388
r 352

U.S. 449 (1967).
U.S. 463 (1966).
U.S. 499 (1967).
U.S. 380 (1957).
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be proper. If this question were answered affirmatively, the Court
would be faced with determining what standards a statute must
meet so as not to violate the first amendment. The Court addressed
itself to this issue in Roth v. United States.' The most important
part of the holding in Roth was that a federal statute7 making it a
criminal offense -to deposit obscene material in the United States
mail was held constitutional.' This established the principle not
articulated in Butler that obscene material would not be afforded
the protection of the first amendment. In addition, the Court announced a test for obscenity: "[WI]hether -to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Depending on how stringently the Supreme Court wished to
apply this broad test, either a liberal or conservative standard of obscenity censorship could have resulted. It was generally felt that
the Court meant to adopt a conservative standard; that is, one favoring broad powers of censorship." But this interpretation was
shortly proved wrong when, in 1957, the Supreme Court handed
down four per curiam decisions'1 which reversed lower court decisions upholding obscenity censorship. In all of the cases the Court
simply cited Roth v. United States," or Alberts v. California,8 a
companion case to Roth, and gave no further opinion. After resorting to the lower court opinions for the facts and comparing
them with the Roth standard for censorship, one might conclude
that the Court intended to apply "the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression [so as] to coifine obscenity censorship, within
very narrow limits .... ."" However, this conclusion would be
based on more speculation than is usually necessary to ascertain a
rule of law from a Supreme Court opinion.
Even though these short opinions indicated the Court's general
6 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For an excellent discussion of the other two cases and the
other issues decided in Roth, see Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing ConstitutionalStandards,45 MINN. L. REV. 18-32 (1960).
7 62 Stat. 768 (1955), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
8 354 U.S. at 492.

9 354 U.S. at 489.
10See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 6, at 31-32.
11 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957); Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
12 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

13 Id.
14 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 6, at 35. For a complete analysis of how this
conclusion is supported, see id. at 32-39.
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approach to the censorship issue, neither did they indicate with certainty where the line lay between the obscene and the nonobscene,
nor did they shed much light on some of the problems inherent in
the Roth test. For example, was a book which had great literary
value but whose dominant theme also appealed to prurient interest
to be withheld from the reading public? Also, did the Court intend to make it impossible for research organizations to obtain admittedly obscene and pornographic material for study purposes?"0
To apply the Roth standard, even under the liberal interpretation
given it by the 1957 term per curiam decisions, would have been to
uphold censorship of both literarily valuable books and the pornographic material requested by the research organization. This was
an unsatisfactory situation, and one that was probably not intended
by the Court when it attempted to define obscenity in the Roth case.
The dilemma posed by the logical extention of the Roth test
to cover these extreme cases, as well as some other problems concerning obscenity censorship, was solved by the Court in a set of
three decisions in 1966. These three decisions were: A Book
Named Memoirs v. Attorney General,6 Ginzburg v.United States,"
and Mishkin v. New York. 8 In the first of these cases, Memoirs,
the Court said that the Roth definition of obscenity, "as elaborated
in subsequent cases,"'" meant that there must be a coalescence of
three elements:
[It must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the ma-

terial taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b)

the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary

community standards relating to the description or representation

of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeem-

ing social value.2 0

Essentially this three-element test breaks the Roth definition of obscenity into two parts, (a) and (b), and adds a third element social value. It is important to note that this definition explicitly
15 For a complete discussion of these and other problems raised by the Roth decision, see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 6, and Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue - What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289

(1961).
16 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
17 383 U.S. 463 (1966).

18 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
19 383 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, Mr. Justice Brennen did not
say what these "subsequent cases" are, but presumably they include the four per curiam
decisions discussed in the text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
20 383 U.S. at 418.
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requires that the three elements must be established independently;
a failure to establish any one of them will result in a judgment that
the material involved is not obscene.2 The addition of the last
element solves part of the dilemma posed by a strict interpretation
of the Roth definition. If material must be "utterly without redeeming social value" to be held obscene, then the literarily valuable, but sex-oriented, book should not be condemned. This third
element announced in Memoirs may even partially solve the hypothetical problem of the obscene material requested by the research
organization.
Thus far in the discussion both criminal and civil actions have
been considered without differentiation. The differences between
these two kinds of actions becomes important in the next step in
the evolution of the test for obscenity. In a civil action, such as a
declaratory judgment where for example a book is sought to be
condemned as obscene, it is the book that is on trial; it is examined
in vacuo according to the current definition of obscenity. Other
factors such as evidence of contemporary community standards may
be considered, but these factors are relevant only as they aid the
Court's understanding of the meaning and effect of the words of
the book.'
On the other hand, in criminal actions, such as a violation of an
obscenity statute, it is a person, not a book, that is on trial; it is the
defendant's conduct that is being examined. Until the Memoirs
decision the Court, with few exceptions,23 looked at the nature of
the material alleged to be obscene as a factor separated from the
conduct of the defendant.'
The issue of obscenity in the criminal
case was therefore treated the same as it was in civil cases.
This compartmentalized thinking strains the very fabric of the
criminal case; it forces apart two elements that, united, form the
basis of the crime. This process is unnatural, and causes the kind
of dilemma posed by the research organization hypothetical mentioned previously. The only reason why this dilemma arose was
the fact that the intended use of the pornographic material seemed
quite proper; and yet under a strict interpretation of the Roth definition of obscenity, the material would have been condemned. The
at 419.
See, e.g., A Book Named Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
23
See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Here Justice Frankfurter
implied by way of dictum that material too indecent for children to read might not be
obscene by an adult standard. Id. at 383.
2
4 See, eg., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 1d.
22

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 19: 748

dilemma could have been avoided if the Roth standard had been
flexible enough to give weight to the future conduct of the organization.
Likewise, a strict interpretation of the words of the Memoirs
three-element test for obscenity would result in the same dilemma
for the research organization. In all three elements of the Memoirs
definition the word "material" is used; there is no mention of conduct. Thus the use that the hypothetical research organization
planned for the pornographic material could not influence the result of the application of the new standard. The new "social value"
element would not justify an exception to the rule; it is clear that
"social value," under strict interpretation, applies to the material
itself, not to the use of the material. This problem could, of course,
be resolved if the Court did not insist upon separating conduct from
the nature of the material.
Although the addition of the social value element solves the
problem of the sex-oriented but literarily valuable book, it creates a
new one. For material to be considered obscene, it must be "utterly
without redeeming social value."25 This means that if a book has
any merit at all, either socially, literarily, or historically, then it
cannot be judged obscene. The practical effect of this requirement
could make it possible for any book to be saved from the censor's
ban merely by the addition of a chapter on, for example, history.
If such a chapter were totally unassociated with the rest of the book,
the Court would probably ignore it as spurious. But it would not
take much ingenuity to integrate this kind of material without destroying the dominant theme. It seems clear, therefore, that a
strict interpretation of the Memoirs definition could have the practical effect of vitiating the whole concept of obscenity censorship.
Unquestionably, the United States Supreme Court is not going to
go this far; yet, strictly speaking, Memoirs does just that. It would
appear reasonable that if the conduct of the person dealing with
such a book were considered, then at least a partial solution to this
newly created problem could be achieved.
In Ginzburg v. United States,2" Justice Brennen, writing for a
majority of the Court, discussed the defendant's conduct in regard
to the issue of obscenity. Specifically, the Court held that evidence
of pandering would be relevant to the issue of obscenity "in close
25 A Book Named Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (emphasis added).
26 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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cases 27 - that is, in cases in which it is questionable whether or
not the material is obscene. Justice Brennen even said, at the beginning of his opinion, that "standing alone, the publications themselves might not be obscene. ' 28 Thus, under Ginzburg the Court
can look at the material to see whether it is sex oriented. If it is,
then it can pass immediately to an examination of the defendant's
conduct in relation to the material; a specific finding that the material is obscene, by itself, is not necessary.
Essentially, the elements of pandering which the Supreme Court
felt relevant to the case can be grouped into two broad categories,
as follow: (1) the presence of deliberate representations on the material itself indicating that it is erotically arousing and pruriently
oriented without saving intellectual content, and (2) circumstances
of presentation and dissemination which are obviously designed to
attract the prurient minded. The Court did not say specifically
whether proof of all or any one of the issues or categories of issues
was necessary; all the Court said was that the evidence was "releThis
vant in determining the ultimate question of obscenity."2'
ambiguity appears to have been resolved by a recent per curiam decision, Books, Inc. v. United States."0
Books was a criminal case involving the prosecution of a paperback book distributor for violation of a federal statute prohibiting
the transportation of obscene books in interstate commerce for the
purpose of sale or distribution. 8 At a jury trial, the defendant had
been found guilty of transporting the book Lust Job in interstate
commerce. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 2 District Judge Wyzanski, writing the opinion of the court,
described the book in the following manner:
[A] tale exclusively devoted to the sexual adventures of its
principal characters. Adulteries, seductions, and orgies are the
only events of importance. The contacts described include not
only sexual intercourse, but sodomy and other perversions. There
is not any serious effort to portray the reality of cultural or social
conditions of even the most neurotic or sordid portion of the populationP
27 383 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added).

281d. at 465.
29 383 U.S. at 470.

30 388 U.S. 449 (1967).
81 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964).
82
3 Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 936 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S.

449 (1967).
331d.
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Based on the results of this analysis of the contents of the book, the
circuit court felt that a jury could find Lust Job obscene within the
definition of obscenity announced in the Memoirs case. 4 Judge
Wyzanski went on to bolster the court's finding of obscenity by
noting that according to Ginzburg, in borderline cases the circumstances under which the material is commercially exploited (pandering) can have a decisive effect upon the determination of the
question of obscenity. 5 Standing on this precedent, he then pointed
to the district court's discussion of the front and back covers of the
book and found therein evidence of pandering. He said that the
title of the book itself, Lust Job, was suggestive, and that the illustration on the cover of the book enhanced this suggestion. Concerning the back cover, the court quoted the following description
found thereon: "A time for shame and lust and everything that
added up to wild bedroom orgies where nobody cared what anybody did as long as they did it and never stopped!" 6
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed 7 citing Redrup v. New York."8 The Redrup decision was
a composition of three State obscenity cases.3 9 In a per curiam opinion, the Court said that in none of these cases was there evidence
of the sort of pandering which it had found significant in Ginzburg, nor did it feel that the material involved in the three cases
was obscene.4"
Since the Supreme Court in Books, Inc. cited the Redrup decision, and since Redrup dismissed the pandering doctrine announced
34 Id. at 937.
Although it appears that the court may have been merely passing
judgment on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict, the fact that it
cited Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), and that it listed the elements of obscenity
set forth in Memoirs, indicate that the court was aware of and carried out its duty to
make an independent judgment of the book's obscenity, as required by the Jacobellis
decision. Thus, when the court said that "a jury could find Lust Job obscene within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1465," it must have meant that it had read the book and
found it to be obscene, and therefore agreed with the conclusion of the jury. 358 F.2d
at 937.
a5 358 F.2d at 937-38.
36 Id. at 937.
37 388 U.S. at 449.

38 386 U.S. 767 (1967).

other two cases were Austin v. Kentucky, and Gent v. Arkansas.
40 386 U.S. at 770. It is interesting to note the method the Court used to arrive at
its conclusion that the material was not obscene. Although not mentioning them by
name, the independent views of seven of the Justices on the definition of obscenity were
39 The

succinctly set forth. (The views of Justices Clark and Harlan, who dissented in the case,
were not included.) The Court then said that no matter which of the views were applied to the cases under consideration, the finding would be that the materials were not
censorable obscenities. Id. at 770-71.
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in Ginzburg as not pertinent to its decision, one could arrive at only
two conclusions: either the Court felt there was no evidence of any
kind of pandering in Books, Inc.,4 1 or the Court felt that there was
no evidence of the sort of pandering which it had found significant
in Ginzburg. Clearly, the first alternative is false because of the
substantial evidence of pandering presented to the circuit court in
Books, Inc. This leaves the second alternative, and there are two
inferences that can be drawn from it, either one or both of which
can be true. The first inference is that by the use of the word,
"significant," the Court may have indicated, in a subtle manner,
the necessary elements to .the proof of pandering. As mentioned
above,42 in Ginzburg the Court discussed two elements which it
considered evidence of pandering. But the Court did not say which
of the elements or categories of elements were necessary to the
proof of pandering. The circuit court in Books, Inc. presented
evidence of pandering, consisting of a discussion of the front and
back covers of the book Last Job.43 Since the Supreme Court in
Books, Inc. effectively disregarded, through reference to Redrup,
the evidence of pandering discussed by the lower court, it might be
fair to assume that the Court did not consider to be relevant to
proof of pandering deliberate representations on the material that
it is erotically arousing. If this is true, then the Court was saying
retrospectively that it did not find the representations made on the
material significant in the Ginzburg case. If this reasoning is correct, then only the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of dissemination of the material must be deemed significant to the proof
of pandering. To carry this rationale one step further, it might be
said that the Court was also distinguishing between the publisherdefendant and the distributor-defendant. Ginzburg involved the
former; Books, Inc. the latter. If evidence pertaining to the circumstances of dissemination is all that is to be considered relevant
to the proof of pandering, common sense dictates that a distributor
such as found in Books will rarely fall within the purview of the
Ginzburg doctrine. A distributor does not advertise to the public,
he is a middleman; whereas the publisher prints the books, and the
retailer sells them. Finally, distributors seldom engage in advertising.
A second inference that can be drawn from interrelating the
41 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
42
Text accompanying note 29 sapra.
43 358 F.2d at 937; text accompanying note 36 supra.
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three cases - Books, Inc., Redrup, and Ginzburg - is that the
Supreme Court's use of the phrase sort of pandering in Redrup v.
New York 4 might indicate an intention to limit Ginzburg to its
facts. First of all, it is clear that there was evidence of pandering
in Books, Inc. Also, this evidence was of the same variety as some
of the evidence of pandering found in Ginzburg. Therefore, if the
Court was saying that the pandering in Books, Inc. was not the
same sort of pandering in Ginzburg, it might have meant that all
of the evidence of pandering in Ginzburg was to be treated as one
unit, rather than several individual elements. The practical effect
of treating all the little bits and pieces of evidence that support the
verdict in a given case is to limit that case to its facts. However,
the most important doctrine established by Ginzburg would still be
left intact: a defendant's conduct in relation to obscene or almost
obscene material can be relevant to the ultimate determination of
obscenity.
It remains to be considered whether both inferences can be
drawn at the same time, and, if so, what the implications would be.
The first inference results in eliminating, as irrelevant to the proof
of pandering, the consideration of deliberate representations on
the material that it was erotically arousing. The second inference
is that Ginzburg has been effectively limited to its facts. There
seems to be no reason why these two inferences may not be drawn
simultaneously. The result would be that representations on the
material would not be considered in regard to the pandering issue.
Pandering would only be found if the circumstances of distribution
were essentially the same as those of Ginzburg.
Regardless of whether one draws the first, second, or both inferences, the resulting Ginzburg rule on pandering would be more
difficult to use to obtain a conviction for an obscenity statute violator. Therefore, so long as at least one inference is in force, one
could say that Books, Inc. indicates that a subtle change has taken
place in the Supreme Court's collective attitude toward obscenity
censorship. This change is in the direction of a more liberal concept of what should be censored, or conversely, what should receive
the protection of the first amendment rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press.
THOMAS
44 386 U.S. at 769.
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